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As is well-known, Duns Scotus adopts a moderately realist stance on the being
of the common natures of categorial entities—substances and accidents. He
believes that such natures have extramental being, such that, though real,
each nature—e.g. humanity, redness, and so on—in itself lacks numerical
unity. Scotus holds, too, that the divine nature is not like this: it is numer-
ically singular, really the same in each exemplification of it. Scotus thus
accepts a version of a more extreme realism in the case of the divine nature.
Here, I intend to show how Scotus distinguishes these two cases and, more
generally, how he understands them. In addition, my investigation also has
ramifications for Scotus’s account of individuation.
I shall first of all give an account of three crucial terms in Scotus’s
theory: predicability, divisibility, and communicability. While Scotus’s use of this
terminology is not always consistent, a reasonably clear overall theory will
emerge. Secondly, I shall look more closely at Scotus’s use of certain identity
claims in the context of his theory of common natures, by way of showing
that he has good reason to hold that the more extreme form of realism that
he accepts in the case of the divine nature is not logically incoherent. In
the third section, I shall show how Scotus argues for the existence of these
different sorts of natures in the cases, respectively, of creatures and of God.
I. DIVISIBILITY, COMMUNICABILITY,
AND PREDICABILITY
The clearest place to start is with a central passage on the issue of predica-
tion:
[1] Nothing in reality, according to any unity at all, is such that
according to that precise unity it is in proximate potency to each
suppositum by a predication that says “This is this.” For although it
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is not incompatible with something existing for it to be in another
singularity than the one it is in, nevertheless it cannot truly be said
of each of its inferiors such that each one is it. This is possible for
an object, the same in number, actually understood by the intellect.
This object as understood has also the numerical unity of an object,
according to which it itself, the very same, is predicable of every
singular by saying “this is this.”1
Predication here is a relation or relations between singular things or objects:
things that have numerical unity. Scotus holds that, generally speaking, the
things or objects between which a predication relation holds are thought-
objects:
[2] Here, [in the proposition] “Caesar is a man,” the existent [viz.
man] is not predicated of the non-existent [viz. Caesar]. Rather,
human nature, conceived as it can be said of many, [is predicated
of] the same nature, conceived as “this.”2
The relata here are thought-objects, variously signifying the nature “as this”
and the nature “as it can be said of many.” Scotus, as [1] makes clear, holds
that the subject term in such a proposition—signifying the nature “as this”—
can refer to an extramental individual or suppositum. But, according to [1],
a similar possibility of reference does not (generally) obtain in the case of
the predicate term. The reason for this is that the predicated object must,
on Scotus’s theory, be numerically one: it must be the same thing, said of
different supposita, or, as [2] makes clear, of the thought-objects signifying
such supposita.3
Two questions are immediately apparent here. Why suppose that the
predicate, if it is a created universal, lacks an extramental referent? Further,
why suppose that the predicated object must be numerically singular? The
answers to these two questions turn out to be related, and are best answered
by considering more closely the character of created natures. For, as both
[1] and [2] make clear in their different ways, the predicated object is, in
fact, the universal concept, abstracted from particulars. Following a tradition
1. Scotus, Ordinatio [= Ord.] 2.3.1.1, n. 37 (Opera Omnia, ed. C. Balic´ et al.
[Civitas Vaticana: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950–], 7:406–7; ET in Paul Vincent
Spade, ed., Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals: Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard,
Duns Scotus, Ockham (Cambridge: Hackett, 1994), pp. 65–66. Suppositum is the techni-
cal medieval term for whatever is an ultimate subject of properties: it is incommuni-
cable (i.e., something that can be neither exemplified nor instantiated). See Scotus,
Ord. 3.5.1–2, n. 5 (Opera Omnia, ed. Luke Wadding, 12 vols. [Lyons, 1639], 7:132),
and, for the applicability of the notion of incommunicability here, Ord. 1.23.un., n. 15
(Vatican, 5:355–6). I discuss incommunicability at length later in the first section of
this article.
2. Scotus, In Perihermeneias, (I) 6–8, n. 7 (Wadding, 3:194b).
3. As we shall see below, the only case in which a predicate term has an extra-
mental referent, and in which the predicated object is both extramental and numer-
ically one, is that in which “God” is the predicate term.
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that can be traced back to Alexander of Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonists,
and was mediated to the medievals through Avicenna, Scotus holds that it is
possible to think about a created nature in three possible ways: (1) in itself
prior to its being instantiated in (or as) individuals; (2) as instantiated in
(or as) individuals; (3) and as a concept predicable of many. To answer the
first question above, we need to consider these three features of a nature in
a little more detail.
According to Scotus, the nature is an object that in itself has not numeri-
cal unity but some sort of “less-than-numerical” unity.4 It exists in each of the
particulars that possesses it, but each such particular is a subjective part of the
nature is (there is some sense in which no particular is the whole nature).
The common nature, in Scotus’s account, has some extramental being of its
own, prior to there being instances of it. I do not mean that Scotus’s theory
of common natures entails that common natures can exist separately from
their instantiations; rather, the nature has a twofold being: its own intrinsic
being, making it not nothing, and a further being as instantiated. The na-
ture can, however, have a further sort of being too: it can have intentional
being as a mental object, and as such it is a universal, the object that is
predicated of individuals of such and such a kind. Universality, like individ-
uality, is an accident of the nature: it is the nature’s accidental existence as a
thought-object. All of these points are put nicely in the following passage:
[3] Just as a nature, according to its being, is not of itself universal but
rather universality is accidental to the nature according to its primary
aspect according to which it is an object, so too in the external thing
where the nature is together with singularity, the nature is not of
itself determined to singularity, but is naturally prior to the aspect
that contracts it to that singularity. . . . [Less-than-numerical unity]
is a proper attribute of the nature according to its primary entity.5
Scotus’s motivation in ascribing some being, some entity, to the common
nature in itself is presumably that, if it had no such being, it would be
nothing at all, and thus could not be the subject of a haecceity. This might
appear to be merely some version of nominalism; however, it is not, because
Scotus is explicit that the common nature is real—extramental. The trick,
as far as Scotus’s account is concerned, is to hold that there can be a real
object that in itself lacks numerical unity.6 (Thus, the unity of the common
4. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.1, nn. 30 and 34 (Vatican, 7:402, 404; Spade, pp. 63–64).
5. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.1, n. 34 (Vatican, 7:404; Spade, pp. 64).
6. As Peter King has pointed out, Ockham located perhaps the most worrisome
feature of Scotus’s account: namely, that a common nature, as divided or instanti-
ated, seems to be both less-than-numerically one, and yet individual: the nature of
Socrates is both “contracted” to its instantiation as the individual Socrates, and yet
common: see Peter King, “Duns Scotus on the Common Nature and the Individual
Differentia,” Philosophical Topics, 20 (1992): 51; see King’s n. 3 for an extensive list
of Ockhamist texts focused on this problem in Scotus’s account. In terms of my
discussion here, we could rephrase the objection as follows: the common nature is
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nature is much tighter than merely aggregative unity. There is no sense
in which the parts of any aggregative whole really exhibits all the features
of that whole defined extensionally. The common nature in itself [prior to
instantiation] does not admit of an extensional definition.)
As we have just seen, Scotus believes that being one or more particulars
is a property of this common nature: it is a property had by the nature in
virtue of its union with one or more individuating haecceities :
[4] Community belongs to the nature outside the intellect, and so
does singularity. Community belongs to the nature from itself, while
singularity belongs to the nature through something in the thing
that contracts the nature.7
On this view, a created common nature that is in many things is not
eo ipso predicable of them; indeed, it is not predicable of them at all. The
reason for this is that Scotus denies such a common nature is in itself numer-
ically singular—and thus that it can satisfy a necessary condition for being
the predicate in a true statement of the form “x is N”:
[5] There is in reality something common that is not of itself a “this.”
Consequently, it is not incompatible with it of itself to be “not-this.”
But that common something is not a universal in act, because it lacks
that indifference according to which the universal is completely
universal—that is, the indifference according to which it itself, the
very same, is predicable by some identity of each individual in such
a way that each is it.8
This is why the predicate term lacks an extramental referent: there is no one
extramental thing for the predicate to refer to. The predicate is numerically
one object that represents equally all the individuals that fall under it.
This brings me to the second question: Why should Scotus hold that
the significate of the predicate term in a statement of the form “x is N” has to
be numerically singular? The reason seems to be that he accepts Aristotle’s
both less-than-numerically one, and yet actually numerically many in its instantia-
tions (contracted to as many individuals as instantiate it). The two problems are in
fact the same, since the point of Ockham’s objection is that each instantiation of the
nature is numerically one; many such instantiations will be numerically many. The
common nature in itself is supposed to be neither numerically one, nor numerically
many, but less-than-numerically one. Scotus’s solution, as sketched by King, is that
the common nature as such is in potentiality to its instantiation as an individual (or
as numerically many individuals). But being less-than-numerically one qua potential
is consistent with being actually numerically one in any given instance (and with
being numerically many in many individuals). For a detailed discussion and defence
of this, see King, “Duns Scotus on the Common Nature,” 64–6, referring to Scotus,
Ord. 2.3.1.5–6, n. 171 (Vatican, 7:476; Spade, p. 102).
7. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.1, n. 42 (Vatican, 7:410; Spade, p. 67).
8. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.1, n. 38 (Vatican, 7:407–8; Spade, p. 66); see also Ord.
2.3.1.1, n. 34 (Vatican, 7:404–5; Spade, pp. 64–65).
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association of universality, predicability, and numerical singularity:
[6] The universal in act is what has some indifferent unity according
to which it itself, the very same, is in proximate potency to being
said of each suppositum. For according to the Philosopher, Posterior
Analytics 1,9 the universal is what is one in many and said of many.10
The significate of the predicate term in a true statement of the form
“x is N” is numerically singular because Aristotle’s account of predication—
and, ultimately, how the term predication is defined—entails this. This nu-
merically singular universal concept represents the particulars that fall under
it. In [1], Scotus talks about this representation as a sort of identity: “the very
same, is predicable of every singular by saying ‘this is this’.” I shall explain
the relevant sense of identity in the next section.
Thus far, the account is reasonably straightforward; however, it has the
disconcerting consequence that the nature in itself—the nature with extra-
mental being considered prior to its instantiation—is not predicable of the
supposita that fall under it. The nature in itself lacks numerical unity, and
any predicate is numerically one. The nature in itself is divisible, capable of
being made numerically many as instantiated in supposita of the same kind:
[7] There are several individuals having the same common being
(esse), which common being is divided into those individuals . . .
[i.e.] into subjective parts.11
Divisibility and predicability are not, in other words, the same. Working out
how to distinguish them is not in itself a problem, given the basic facts that
divisibility entails numerical multiplicity, and predicability entails numerical
singularity (i.e., indivisibility). There is, however, a startling further conse-
quence to this distinction: a universal on Scotus’s analysis—a predicable
object—turns out to be numerically singular and thus (paradoxically) an
individual. Indivisibility, individuality, and singularity are all, in this context,
synonyms. Recall that divisibility (into numerically many things) entails less-
than-numerical unity, and thus that numerical unity entails indivisibility. The
universal is numerically one; so it is indivisible. And individuality is defined
as indivisibility.12 While this in not such an odd thought, given that univer-
sals are (with the exception of the divine nature) merely thought objects,
it forces us to be a bit more careful in our understanding of passages such
9. 1.4 (73b26–33).
10. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.1, n. 37 (Vatican, 406–7; Spade, p. 65). I take it that the
numerical identity of the concept is not a claim about the mental acts or qualities
themselves, but about the contents of these acts. My thought of N has the same content
as anyone else’s; but the thought itself is a distinct thing from anyone else’s.
11. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.4, n. 106 (Vatican, 7:443; Spade, p. 85). Scotus’s use of esse
here is doubtless supposed to be equivalent to essence, in line with his usual practice.
12. See e.g. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.2, n. 48 (Vatican, 7:412–13; Spade, p. 69).
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as [2] above. The universal is a numerically singular thought object that sig-
nifies (or can signify) the extramental common nature; the same thought
object can be considered, too, as signifying (or as being able to signify) not
the common nature but some extramental instantiation of that nature.
Scotus himself is reluctant to draw explicitly the conclusion that the
universal is individual, though, as we shall see below, he does so in connec-
tion with the divine nature, an immanent universal. Furthermore, I have
already given sufficient evidence to show that he is unequivocally commit-
ted to the numerical singularity of the universal concept. Thus, there turns
out to be a problem in Scotus’s presentation, which is that divisibility often
appears to be defined as predicability, and indivisibility as impredicability.
The problem specifically is located in Scotus’s attempts to define what a
subjective part is, because the definitions that Scotus offers tend to associate
subjective parts with predicates:
[8] There is among beings something indivisible into subjective
parts—that is, such that it is formally incompatible for it to be di-
vided into several parts each of which is it. . . . What is it in this stone,
by which as by a proximate foundation it is absolutely incompatible
for it to be divided into several parts each of which is this stone, the
kind of division that is proper to a universal whole as divided into
its subjective parts?13
[9] A universal whole, which is divided into individuals and into
subjective parts, is predicated of each of those subjective parts in
such a way that each subjective part is it.14
This may make us think that divisibility and predicability are synonymous.
After all, Scotus expressly notes that divisibility is proper to a universal whole.
In addition, he apparently states that the relation that exists between a uni-
versal whole and its parts is predicability.
Equally, other passages make it clear that indivisibility in this sense en-
tails impredicability. For example, the ex professo discussion of individuation
is often cast in terms of a discussion of impredicability:
[10] In every categorial hierarchy there can be found some-
thing intrinsically individual and singular of which the species is
predicated—or at least there can be found something not predica-
ble of many.15
Here, the individual and the impredicable appear to be identified.
On this reading, then, divisibility entails predicability, and indivisibil-
ity impredicability. But I take it that these claims are mistakes, perhaps
springing from the difficulty of describing the relation of divisibility. It is
important to keep in mind that these mistakes do not accord with Scotus’s
13. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.2, n. 48 (Vatican, 7:413; Spade, p. 69).
14. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.4, n. 106 (Vatican, 7:443; Spade, p. 85).
15. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.4, n. 90 (Vatican, 7:434; Spade, p. 80).
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standard usage. Other texts in the same series of questions on individuation
seem to suggest something quite different from passages [8] to [10], and
more in line with the thrust of my account of Scotus’s passages [1] to [7]
above. Thus, Scotus often denies that a divisible common nature is predi-
cable: see, most notably, passage [7] quoted above. Furthermore, this kind
of predicability is sometimes held to entail not divisibility but indivisibility
(i.e., singularity). Passage [1] is the most obvious case, but there are other
examples too:
[11] What is common in creatures is not really one in the way in
which what is common is really one in the divine. For there the
common is singular and indivisible because the divine nature itself
is of itself a “this.” And it is plain that with creatures no universal
is really one in that way. For to maintain this would be to maintain
that some created, undivided nature would be predicated of many
individuals by a predication that says “this is this,” just as it is said
that the Father is God and the Son is the same God.16
Scotus thus has two quite distinct relations in mind when he speaks of
predicability and divisibility—relations that his initial association of divisi-
bility into subjective parts with the universal whole tends to obscure. This
is further confirmed by things stated elsewhere when discussing the related
notion of communicability. When discussing the distinction between the di-
vine nature and a Scotist common nature, Scotus notes:
[12] Any nature is communicable to many by identity; therefore
the divine nature is so communicable. . . . But it is not divisible, [as
is clear] from the question on the unity of God. Therefore it is
communicable without division.17
The point about the divine nature is that it is numerically one: its numerical
unity prevents its divisibility: “The unity of God is proved from the fact that
divine infinity is not divided into many essences.”18 The divine nature is
thus what modern philosophers would call an immanent universal. In this,
it is contrasted with a created common nature, which, in itself, has a unity
that is less-than-numerical, and as divided into its instances is numerically
many. So, in [12], Scotus claims that divisibility entails a lack of numerical
unity (in fact, he argues that numerical unity entails indivisibility, but the two
claims are of course logically equivalent). This is not an oversight; Scotus
expressly states that indivisibility is consistent with communicability (“in-
divisibility does not entail incommunicability”).19 Scotus is making a clear
distinction here between those natures that are divisible (into numerically
many subjective parts) and those that are not. Scotus misleadingly describes
16. Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.1, n. 39 (Vatican, 7:408; Spade, p. 66).
17. Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, n. 381 (Vatican, 2:346).
18. Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, n. 367 (Vatican, 2:339).
19. Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, n. 367 (Vatican, 2:340).
50 RICHARD CROSS
both of these relations in terms of predicability: something “communicable
by identity” is such that every suppositum to which it is communicated “is it.”20
We have already seen how Scotus defines divisibility in this way (though, as
I have tried to show, the official account of divisibility, found in Scotus’s
discussion of individuation, is in fact aporetic). The divine nature is a uni-
versal: it is thus numerically singular and individual in a way that no other
extramental nature is (since no other extramental nature is a universal).
One reason why it is important to be clear here is because of the prob-
lems associated with translating medieval terminology into modern termi-
nology. One modern commentator claims that individuality should be con-
ceived as noninstantiability, and that both in turn should be identified with
incommunicability:
There are those [medieval philosophers] who conceive individuality as
noninstantiability, that is, as the impossibility for individuals to become
instantiated in the way that universals can. Thus Socrates, for example,
cannot be instantiated into other human beings or any other things
for that matter, unlike “human being,” which can be instantiated into
Socrates, Aristotle, and the readers of this book. Scholastics developed
a notion similar to this, but they called it “incommunicability.” This is
in every way the most successful understanding of individuality in my
opinion.21
This understanding is not quite Scotus’s. Scotus distinguishes individ-
uality from incommunicability, for, as we shall see, he believes that there
is at least one individual that is communicable—namely, the divine nature.
The issue is in part terminological, but, if pushed, we should want to claim
the following set of equivalences between Scotus and modern terminol-
ogy. Suppose that an instantiation is a particular property or nature, such
that Socrates’s whiteness is an instance or instantiation of whiteness. Sup-
pose further that an exemplification is a substance that bears a relation to
a universal property or nature, such that Socrates is an exemplification of
the universal whiteness (assuming that he is white). Thus, communicability
is exemplifiability, divisibility is instantiability. Consequently, incommunica-
bility is non-exemplifiability, and indivisibility noninstantiability. The reader
should note that incommunicability and noninstantiability are clearly dis-
tinguished here. A created substantial common nature has instances; the
divine nature has exemplifications.22
20. Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, n. 380 (Vatican, 2:346).
21. Jorge J. E. Gracia, Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the
Counter-Reformation 1150–1650, SUNY Series in Philosophy (Albany: State University
of New York Press, 1994), 6.
22. So the following assessment needs correction: “Scotus . . . understand[s] the
intension of individuality as incommunicability or noninstantiability” (Woosuk Park,
“Understanding the Problem of Individuation: Gracia vs. Scotus,” in John Duns Scotus:
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I take it, too, that communicability and predicability are synonymous.
Scotus’s claim is that a created nature is communicable in the sense that
the nature as universal (a numerically singular mental object) is predicable
of a mental object that represents an extramental individual; the divine na-
ture is an extramental individual that is predicable of each divine person.23
Metaphysics and Ethics, ed. Ludger Honnefeldr, Rega Wood, and Mechthild Dreyer,
Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, 53 [E. J. Brill: Leiden,
New York, and Cologne, 1996], p. 276). Individuality is indeed noninstantiability;
but it is not incommunicability. I suspect that this oversight results from the fact that
modern commentators simply do not discuss the notion of incommunicability in
Scotus in this context at all, and merely repeat Scotus’s misleading characterization
of divisibility as a relation between a universal and its subjective parts. In point
of fact, Scotus certainly believes that, if there are blocks on an individual created
nature’s being exemplified by many supposita, these blocks do not result from the
individuality of the nature: see Scotus, Ord. 3.1.2, nn. 5–6 (Wadding, 7:36–37), and
my discussion in “Duns Scotus on Divine Substance and the Trinity,” (forthcoming).
Put another way, individuality is not non-exemplifiability as such, since in principle
individuals can be exemplified; what individuals cannot be is divided: they cannot
be made numerically many. For an individual to be exemplified is for it to be a
one-of-many (or perhaps a “one-of-one” if it should be that an individual is uniquely
exemplified; of course, with the exception of Christ’s human nature and the divine
essence, no individual is in fact exemplified: for the communicability of Christ’s
individual human nature, see Ord. 3.1.1, n. 10 [Wadding, 7:16]; Quodlibetum 19, n. 11
[Wadding, 12:502; ET published as Duns Scotus, God and Creatures: The Quodlibetal
Questions, ed. and trans. Felix Alluntis and Allan B. Wolter (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1975), pp. 427–28 (nn. 19.33-5)]). As I will show below, Scotus is
quite clear that the divine nature is communicable—that is, exemplifiable—without
its being divisible. The divine nature is unequivocally individual. We should note too
a consequence of Scotus’s view, which is that accidents are both instantiable and (in
a sense) exemplifiable. Socrates’s whiteness is an instance of whiteness; and it inheres
in Socrates, who is to that extent an exemplification of the universal whiteness:
on the inherence of accidents, see Richard Cross, The Physics of Duns Scotus: The
Scientific Context of a Theological Vision (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 103–6,
114.
23. Scotus consistently distinguishes between two types of predication relation:
formal predication, and predication by identity. He never gives a clear and thorough
account of his understanding of the distinction. This is unfortunate, not least be-
cause Scotus, as we have seen, is prepared to talk about identity between subject and
predicate even in the case of statements about creatures, whereas the notion of predi-
cability by identity was introduced into medieval theology specifically as a way of deal-
ing with Trinitarian difficulties. (The probable origin is Bonaventure, Commentaria in
Quatuor Libros Sententiarum, 1.5.1.1 ad 2 [Opera Omnia, 10 vols. (Quaracchi: Collegium
Sancti Bonaventurae, 1882–1902), 1:113].) A brief ex professo account of the distinc-
tion can be found in Scotus, Ord. 1.4.2.un., text. int. (Vatican, 4:4, ll. 14–16). However,
we can learn more from other discussions. Most notably, at one point Scotus seems
to suggest that the distinction between the two sorts of predication has to do with
the reference of the predicate term: in formal predication, the predicate lacks any sort
of referent; in predication by identity, the predicate has an extramental referent: see
Scotus, Ord. 3.7.1, n. 4 (Wadding, 7:190). Yet even this is not quite sufficient. For, as
we have seen, Scotus talks of the relation between a (mental) universal and the sub-
ject that it predicates as identity. My suggestion is this: A formal predication asserts
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If we keep all this in mind, the predicability claim that Scotus seemingly
makes about common natures in the definition of “divisibility into subjective
parts” can be seen for what it is. The point of claiming that a nature is
divisible into subjective parts, presumably, is that each instantiation of a
common nature exhibits all the intensional features of that nature: there is
no feature of stone-nature that a stone lacks. We should not, however, think
of this as a predicability relation in the same way as universals are predicable.
After all, there is a sense in which a stone is only a part (a subjective part)
of stone nature; there is no sense in which an exemplification of a universal
is a part of the universal (despite Scotus’s very misleading claim in [8] and
[9] that a universal is divisible into subjective parts).
I have tried to show thus far that Scotus holds that common natures—
the natures of creatures—are objects that exhibit less-than-numerical unity.
It is for this reason that the nature can receive the accidental modification of
predicability when existing as a mental object. In contrast to this, a universal
(whether mental or extramental) is a one-of-many, a properly exemplified
nature really predicated of its supposita. In the next section, I want to examine
what it is for a universal to be communicable/predicable by identity. On the
face of it, this sort of claim seems to involve postulating an identity between
a suppositum and its nature. This may seem to present Scotus with identity
problems of a Leibnizian kind, particularly if the universal nature is—like
the suppositum—an extramental existent.
II. IMMANENT UNIVERSALS AND PREDICABILITY
Scotus’s moderate realism involves the disarming claim that there exist
objects that lack numerical unity. This claim looks so counterintuitive—
both for us (who tend to assume that everything that exists is numeri-
cally one) and for the medievals (who tend equivalently to assume that
being and unity are convertible)—that Scotus must have some strong mo-
tivations for wanting to accept it.24 There is one obvious such motivation:
that accepting immanent universals (extramental objects that are predica-
ble singulars)—accepting, in other words, the sort of extreme realism that
that the individual exemplifies a divisible common nature. A necessary condition
for the truth of such a predication is that a universal mental object—a predicate—is
identical with the mental object that represents the subject of the predication. Thus,
the formal predication of a nature requires for its truth the predication-by-identity of
a universal (where this universal is, in the case of every creaturely essence, merely a
concept).
24. On the relevance of this worry for Aquinas’s theory of the common nature
found in De Ente et Essentia, see Joseph Owens, “Common Nature: A Point of Com-
parison Between Thomistic and Scotistic Metaphysics,” Mediaeval Studies, 19 (1957):
1–14. Aquinas infers from the fact that a nature lacks unity that it lacks any sort of
being too.
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allows that there can be objects which are both numerically singular and
repeated in different supposita—raises intolerable problems for the indis-
cernibility of identicals. Some of Scotus’s objections to this form of extreme
realism appear to be objections along these lines. However, as I shall show
in a moment, we have to be very careful how we understand these objec-
tions, since Scotus clearly holds that there is one nature, the divine nature,
which is, indeed, an immanent universal. In addition Scotus does not be-
lieve that the doctrine of the Trinity raises any insuperable problems for
the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. I am not suggesting that
Scotus accepts some kind of relative identity in this context (although he
may well, in other contexts, accept something analogous to it); rather, I am
suggesting that, ultimately, Scotus does not believe that accepting extreme
realism presents any difficulties even for someone who accepts Leibniz’s
law.
Arguing for this is not easy, largely because it is not easy to unpack every-
thing that Scotus has to say in criticism and defense of immanent universals.
Certainly, many commentators accept without reservation that Scotus’s wor-
ries about such universals stem from concerns about identity. For example,
in his magisterial commentary on a whole series of texts from Scotus and
Ockham on the nature of universals, Martin Tweedale ascribes Scotus’s claim
that the actual universal, as predicable, is just a concept (an ens objectivum), to
Scotus’s understanding of this:
My way of defending Scotus . . . is to make plausible the idea that a con-
junction of predications of the form “A is B, and C is B, and D is B, etc.,”
where the subject terms all stand for distinct singular real things, and
the predicated item B is a single item too, can only be true if B is an
ens objectivum. I argue as follows: Suppose B is not an ens objectivum but
something with real being. Then either B has numerical unity or it does
not but has some unity less than numerical. Not the former, for then
A, C, D etc. would all be identical to the same individual and thus identical
to each other [my italics]. . . . Not a unity less than numerical, for then to
be real B would have to be at least possibly numerically many, but no
numerically singular thing, like A, C, and D, is even possibly numerically
many.25
A minimal requirement for a theory of universals is that it must be consistent
with the claim that there are (or can be) numerically distinct supposita of
the same kind. An obvious application of the transitivity of identicals to the
sort of identity claim made here shows that the strongly realist theory is
inconsistent with the possible existence of numerically distinct supposita of
the same kind.
25. Martin M. Tweedale, Scotus vs. Ockham—A Medieval Dispute over Universals,
2 vol. (Lewiston, Queenstown, and Lampeter: The Edwin Mellen Press), 2:648, com-
menting on Scotus, Ord. 2.3.1.1, n. 34 (Vatican, 7:404; Spade, pp. 64–65).
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At many points, Scotus himself seems to argue similarly. For example:
[13] The universal is numerically one object of the intellect, and is
understood by numerically one intellection, such that the intellect,
in attributing [the universal] to diverse singulars, attributes numer-
ically the same object, conceived many times, to diverse subjects, in
stating “this is this.” But it seems impossible that something real is
numerically the same intelligible thing and yet be predicated in this
way of diverse [subjects].26
To understand this argument, we need to be clear about both the context
and the sort of object that Scotus has in mind. The context is the individu-
ation of created substances; the sort of object that Scotus has in mind is a
created nature. As I shall show in the next section, one of Scotus’s arguments
against extreme realism is that the only sort of nature that can be numer-
ically one in all of its supposita is an infinite nature. All created natures are
finite. The impossibility that Scotus is talking about in [13] extends only to
finite natures. Thus, Scotus cannot be talking about logical impossibility in
[13], and he cannot, therefore, have in mind serious worries about identity.
What blocks a finite nature from being numerically one in all of its supposita
is its finitude—it is, we might say, not big enough to go around. It is this
impossibility that Scotus has in mind in [13].27
This finitude argument strikes me as particularly weak. I will discuss
its difficulties in the next section. Fortunately, as I shall also show in the
next section, Scotus’s arguments against extreme realism in the case of
created natures do not rely on the finitude argument. Still, the discussion
is a salutary corrective against the more usual readings of Scotus’s objec-
tion to extreme realism, as found, for example, in Tweedale’s commentary.
Scotus’s argument against extreme realism is made harder to grasp by the
fact that he clearly thinks (less than ideally) of every type of instantiation
or exemplification as a (weak) form of identity. In these sorts of contexts,
Scotus believes that our most perspicuous way of proceeding is by talking
of a ‘formal’ distinction, the sort of real distinction whose terms are not
things but properties (quiddities in Scotus’s terminology).28 Scotus applies
26. Scotus, Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis [= In Metaph.] 7.18,
n. 21 (Opera Philosophica [= OPh] ed. Girard. J. Etzkorn and others [St Bonaventure,
N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1997–], 4:343).
27. There is another possible interpretation of arguments such as that proposed
in [13]. In his most unequivocal statement of this sort of criticism, Scotus states
that the view that an extramental universal is really predicable of instances of it is
straightforwardly contradictory, not because of worries about identity, but because
it entails that numerically one and the same thing (the universal) is both the essence
of many and external to them: see Scotus, In Metaph. 7.18, n. 15 (OPh, 4:341).
28. See, for example, Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, nn. 388-410 (Vatican, 2:349–61);
for the description of the distinction as having properties rather than things as its
terms, see nn. 400–403 (Vatican, 2:355–7); in particular “essence does not include
in its formal quidditative notion (ratio) the property of a suppositum, nor vice versa.
For this reason it can be conceded that—prior to any act of the intellect—there is
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the distinction in this context as a way of distinguishing the divine essence
from its exemplifications (namely, the divine persons). On the one hand,
Scotus believes that separability is necessary for real distinction. Since there
is no sense in which an essence is (under normal non-theological—non-
Christological—circumstances) exemplified or instantiated contingently,
we should not think of supposita as separable from their essences. On the
other hand, no essence is in every way identical with its supposita; since (min-
imally) it is true of the essence (but not of its supposita) that it is instantiated
or exemplified, and true of the supposita (and not of the essence) that they
instantiate or exemplify:
[14] Here there remains a further difficulty. Unless some dis-
tinction is posited between the notion of essence and the no-
tion of suppositum, it does not seem intelligible that the essence
is numerically one while the supposita are many. . . . I say with-
out asserting it, and without prejudice to some better opinion
that the notion by which a suppositum is incommunicable (let
it be ‘a’) and the notion of essence as essence (let it be ‘b’)
have some distinction prior to every act of intellect, whether cre-
ated or uncreated. I prove it thus: The first suppositum [viz. the
Father] formally possesses communicable entity [viz. the divine
essence], otherwise he could not communicate it; and he really pos-
sesses incommunicable entity too, otherwise he could not positively
be a suppositum in real entity.29
It is easy enough to see, through all the scholastic jargon, what Scotus is
getting at. In fact, I suspect he overestimates the amount of theory required
to get an account of the distinction between the divine essence and the
divine persons up and running. It is clearly an abuse of Leibniz to use his
law to show that a suppositum is identical with its nature. (It may be—though
I doubt it—that supposita are identical with their natures; however, this is
not something that can be decided by fiat.) There is no reason for us to
think of instantiation or exemplification as forms of identity at all, and we
should resist all temptation to do so. But if we resist this temptation, which
is perhaps not a particularly powerful one in any case, then the fact that
the divine persons exemplify a nature that is numerically one will not lead
us to suppose that the different exemplifications (the divine persons) are
identical with each other.
a reality of the essence, by which it is communicable, and a reality of the suppositum
by which it is incommunicable”: n. 403 (Vatican, 2:357).
29. Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, nn. 388-90 (Vatican, 2:349–50). Scotus’s application
of this formal distinction to the doctrine of the Trinity provoked some controversy
in the early fourteenth century—compare for example his somewhat reserved ex-
position in [14] with the rather drier and more distinctive version from the earlier
Lectura (usually dated to the last two or three years of the thirteenth century): “Let
him who can grasp this grasp it, because that it is so my intellect does not doubt”:
Scotus, Lectura 1.2.2.1–4, n. 375 (Vatican, 16:217).
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Scotus expressly uses this strategy to reply in the Trinitarian context to
arguments such as that raised by Tweedale above:
[15] If you say that we can at least conclude from the real identity of
[the persons] with the essence to their identity with each other, I say
that the essence does not have such unique identity of subsistence
as the persons or personal [properties] have that the extremes are
united in an essence. For this reason the identity of the subsistents
or subsistence cannot be inferred on the basis of their identity in
the essence as in a medium.
From this, the response to sophistical arguments, such as “This God
is the Father, the Son is this God, therefore the Son is the Father”
is clear. (This [sophism] is [apparently] confirmed by the fact that,
if the middle term exists as a “this something,” then the extremes
are necessarily united.) I reply: just as in creatures, the common is a
“such” (se habet ut quale quid), and the singular a “this something,” so
here, the essence, common to the persons, has the role of a “such,”
and the person has the role of a “this something.” The middle term
here is a “such,” not a “this something.” But the identity of the ex-
tremes in the conclusion is concluded as if the medium were a “this
something.” So in the argument here, there seems to be a fallacy of
the accident and of the consequent (because “this God” is under-
stood in the premisses for different supposita), and likewise a fallacy
of the figure of speech, changing “such” into “this something.”30
In the first paragraph of [15], Scotus notes that we would not want to argue
from the exemplification of numerically one essence to the identity of the
supposita exemplifying the essence. In the second paragraph, Scotus shows
how this insight can be used to block troublesome but ultimately sophistical
arguments to this effect. Being an exemplification of the divine essence
does not entail being wholly identical with this essence; the fallacy lies in
supposing that the term God fails to refer to a kind (or something like a
kind) rather than to an individual.
All this allows us to get a clearer insight on Scotus’s talk about pred-
icability or communicability by identity. The relationship that Scotus has
in mind here is something that cannot obtain between a common nature
and its instances. The common nature is divided up between its instances,
and is thus not identical (in the sense relevant here) with any of them, and
certainly not with all of them. According to Scotus, however, an immanent
universal certainly is identical, in the sense I am discussing here, with its
exemplifications. (So, too, is a universal concept, at least to the extent that
one and the same object represents equally every particular that falls under
30. Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, nn. 414–15 (Vatican, 2:363–4). For the fallacies,
see Aristotle, Soph. el. 1 (166b28–30, 167b1–3, and 166b10–14 respectively). A
similar argument occurs at Scotus, Ord. 1.4.1. un., text. int. (Vatican, 4:382, ll.
33–34).
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it.) We could claim that the relevant identity in the case of a universal is that
the universal itself is numerically identical in its different exemplifications
in a way that a common nature fails to be. So the sense of communicable by
identity, when predicated of an immanent universal, must be something like
the following: A nature N is communicable by identity to a subject s if and
only if, both, s is an exemplification of N, and any part of N is also a part of s.
The point of the second conjunct here is that there is no sense in which any
part of a nature is distinct from its subject; in short, the nature does not have
subjective parts at all in the sense outlined above. Expressing the concept
in this way helps us to see why Scotus should have—albeit undesirably—
decided to think of exemplification as a form of identity. Of course, it is
not really a form of identity at all, despite Scotus’s terminology. It is just
a way of taking about a relationship in which the nature is not divided up
into its various instantiations. In the case of an immanent universal, the
whole nature is genuinely repeated, without division into subjective parts, in
each of its exemplifications. In such cases, then, the predicate term, as well
as the subject term, has an extramental referent: the immanent universal
itself.31
III. ARGUMENTS FOR MODERATE REALISM
Scotus, then, rightly does not reject extreme realism because of identity
concerns. In fact, the arguments he generally employs—setting aside the
sorts of argument, such as that cited in [13] above, that appear to trade on
questions of identity—appeal to the empirical facts of the universe: created
supposita are such that the natures of which they are instances cannot be im-
manent universals. The force of the arguments lies in their attempts to show
why this should be the case. There are basically three clusters of arguments:
(1) from the finitude of created essences; (2) from the fact that different
substances of the same kind possess numerically distinct quantitative acci-
dents; (3) from the fact that different substances of the same kind perform
distinct operations. In this section, I will examine these three clusters.
(Argument 1) If numerically one thing is to be repeated in numeri-
cally many different exemplications, then the repeated object is in no sense
limited to any one exemplification. In this sense, the repeatability of numer-
ically one object requires that the object is limitless—that is, infinite. But no
created object is both numerically one and infinite. Therefore no created
object is an immanent universal.32
31. On this, see n. 25 above.
32. Scotus, Ord. 1.2.2.1–4, n. 385 (Vatican, 2:348); Ord. 3.1.2, nn. 3–4 (Wadding,
7:33–34). For a related argument, focusing on perfection rather than infinity, see
Ord. 2.3.1.2, n. 52 (Vatican, 7:415; Spade, p. 70).
58 RICHARD CROSS
This argument is hardly convincing as it stands, since it equivocates on
senses of limitless. It is one thing for there being no restrictions on the re-
peatability of an essence, and quite another for there to be no restrictions on
an essence tout court. I do not know what could be done to the argument to
salvage it from this objection. Possibly, Scotus appeals to it so readily because
of its close relation to arguments found in his immediate predecessors.33
More likely, perhaps, is Scotus’s quasi-mathematical way of understanding
divine infinity as analogous to the set of all integers.34 Such an essence can-
not be divided into numerically many (infinite) supposita as subjective parts,
because the infinite cannot be added to. Furthermore, any finite essence
can be divided into subjective parts without falling foul of the mathematical
difficulty Scotus perceives in the division of an infinite essence.35 Hence,
communicability without divisibility entails infinity. Most likely perhaps is
the following simple thought. According to Scotus, the intrinsic infinity of
the divine essence is what individuates this essence.36 A created nature, con-
trariwise, is individuated by a haecceity extrinsic to the nature. No created
nature is individual of itself, and thus every created nature can be divided.
In short, infinity entails being numerically one, and thus indivisible.
Scotus’s remaining arguments are much more metaphysically challeng-
ing. There are, broadly speaking, two of them, both very similar in basic
thrust but both starting from rather different premisses. As I shall show,
they both suffer in Scotus’s presentation from a similar defect. However,
with one small modification both of them appear to me to be salvageable.
(Argument 2) When presenting his account of individuation, Scotus
attempts to highlight some counterfactual consequences of accepting im-
manent universals:
[16] This opinion posits that that one substance [viz. the universal],
under many accidents, will be the whole substance of all individuals,
and then it will be both singular and this substance of this thing
[x], and in another thing [y] than this thing [x]. It will also follow
that the same thing will simultaneously possess many quantitative
dimensions of the same kind; and it will do this naturally, since
33. See, for example, Henry of Ghent, Quodlibeta [= Quod.] 6.7 (2 vol. [Paris,
1518], 1:220vC);William of Ware, In Sententias 159 (Vienna, O¨sterreichische Nation-
albibliothek, MS Lat. 1438, fo. 107ra). I deal with some of these matters in my The
Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2002).
34. See Richard Cross, Duns Scotus, (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1999), pp. 39–41.
35. For the first of these claims, see e.g. Ord. 1.2.1.3, n. 175 (Vatican, 2:232;
ET in Duns Scotus, Philosophical Writings: A Selection, ed. and trans. Allan B. Wolter
[Indianapolis, IL, Hackett, 1978], p. 88). I do not think that Scotus ever makes the
second explicitly; but I can think of no reason, whether textual or conceptual, why
Scotus could not accept it.
36. Scotus, Ord. 1.8.1.3, n. 149 (Vatican, 4:227).
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numerically one and the same substance is under these [viz. x’s]
dimensions and other [viz. y’s] dimensions.37
At first glance, Scotus appears to be making two objections here. The first
is the kind of identity objection that I have already argued Scotus does not
accept. The second is that one substance will have different (and contrary)
accidents of the same kind. In fact, it is not clear to me that the first of
these objections should be seen as such at all. Partly, I think this because
there is good reason to suppose that Scotus really does not want to make
coherence objections to extreme realism. But there is a further reason for
denying this reading. If we read the argument in this way, the parenthetical
“under many accidents” is otiose. We should read the passage as offering
just one argument:
(1) If extreme realism is true, then numerically one substance is the
essence of many supposita. (Premiss)
(2) If numerically one substance is the essence of many supposita,
then if the substance can be the bearer of quantitative accidents,
numerically one substance is simultaneously the subject of contrary
quantitative accidents. (Premiss)
(3) It is not possible for numerically one substance to be simultane-
ously the subject of contrary quantitative accidents. (Premiss)
(4) It is not the case that numerically one substance that can be a
bearer of quantitative accidents is the essence of many individuals.
(From [2] and [3])
(5) It is not the case that extreme realism is true for those substances
that can be bearers of quantitative accidents. (From [1], [2], and
[4])
There is an alarming feature of this argument, which is that it presup-
poses that it is the universal (the “substance” in the above argument), rather
than the suppositum, that is properly the subject of quantitative accidents.
As we shall see below, Scotus tends to think about substances in this (clearly
mistaken) way—presumably because of the close association in his mind
between the universal and its individuality: an extramental universal is itself
an individual (though not incommunicable) thing, and it is a short step
from this intuition to the further one that it is itself the subject of certain
accidental modifications.
(Argument 3) The final argument as presented by Scotus on the face
of it relies on a questionable assumption that is closely related to the ques-
tionable assumption made in the second argument:
[17] Every form, existing as a form in another, gives to that thing that
the thing is denominated by its [viz. the form’s] action, just as [the
37. Scotus, Reportatio Parisiensis 2.12.5, n. 3 (Wadding, 11:326b); see also Ord.
2.3.1.1, nn. 37, 41 (Vatican, 7:406–7, 409–10; Spade, pp. 65–67).
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form] gives existence (esse) to the thing. And although a form [ex-
isting] in a suppositum is denominated by its [viz. the form’s] action,
nevertheless [it is not so] by final denomination, but the suppositum
is more finally denominated by the same action [of the form]. But
suppose some per se existent form naturally has some proper action.
If this [form] gives the same existence to many . . . then by [some-
thing’s] having existence through this form,38 it is denominated by
the same action [just as if it had the same existence of that active
form]. When therefore [the objection] claims “action belongs to a
suppositum, therefore there are many actions of many supposita,” I
deny the consequence except in the case that the thing which is the
ratio agendi [i.e., the form] is multiplied in [these supposita].39
The questionable assumption here is that a suppositum has (some of)
its accidental properties—namely, its operations—in some sense indirectly:
these properties inhere in the suppositum by inhering directly in the essence
or nature exemplified or instantiated by the suppositum. The claim clarifies
the questionable assumption made in the second argument, by specifying
that the accidents do not inhere merely in the essence or nature. Neverthe-
less, we would perhaps not want to be saddled even with Scotus’s weaker
claim that some accidents inhere directly in the essence or nature and only
indirectly in the suppositum. Of course, if we made this claim, we could again
see why Scotus should believe that supposita exemplifying numerically one
universal should have some of their accidents also in common. More inter-
esting, however, is that the sort of accidents it focuses on are not quantities
(as in the second argument) but operations. This focus provides a way for us
to see how the numerical identity of an essence causes the numerical identity
of operations, even if we unequivocally reject the questionable assumption
that operations are brought about by the essence as such, rather than the
supposita.
Suppose we reject Scotus’s assumption and adjust the argument accord-
ingly. To do this, we need to suppose that all talk of operations requires talk
of the causal powers in virtue of which these operations are brought about.
(This does not seem to me to be an unreasonable assumption, though it is
admittedly not a popular one today.) Clearly, the possession of causal pow-
ers correlates with the possession of an essence. Anything that possesses an
essence of a certain sort possesses the causal powers for which the possession
of the essence is sufficient.40 Whether or not we would regard possession
38. Reading ista forma as ablative—contrary to the apparent suggestion in the
edition.
39. Scotus, Ord. 1.12.1, n. 51 (Vatican, 5:54–55); at the passage marked with
ellipsis, Scotus talks of whiteness doing things.
40. This does not mean that all of a suppositum’s causal powers are possessed in
virtue of its essence. Further, it might not be easy to distinguish those powers that
are possessed in virtue of an essence from those that are not. Perhaps we could claim
that causal powers that all members of a species possess are possessed in virtue of
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of an essence as (in an Aristotelian world such as Scotus’s) reducible to the
possession of certain causal powers, I think we would at least want to re-
gard the possession of numerically one essence by many different supposita
as sufficient for those supposita possessing numerically the same set of causal
powers. But it is easy enough to show that, on any reasonable understand-
ing of causal powers, such supposita will all perform numerically identical
operations. Operations in this theory are brought about in virtue of causal
powers. Operation a is brought about by a suppositum x in virtue of x’s pos-
session of power P. For x to bring about a is just for x’s power P to be active.
But suppose P is possessed both by x and by another suppositum y. P is active,
and possessed by y. So y brings about a as much as x does. It is no objection
to this to claim that x can use P without y using P. Agency, if analyzed in
terms of causal powers, cannot properly involve talk of supposita using causal
powers except on pain of infinite regress. If x uses P, then x must possess a
power—P1—for using P, and another power—P2—for using P1; and so on
ad infinitum.41 So we block the regress at the first step, and analyze action in
terms of the possession of a causal power that is active.
So supposita that exemplify immanent universals share numerically the
same operations as other supposita of the same kind (for at least some of their
operations). But there are no created supposita which are such that every
suppositum of a certain kind shares such a numerically singular operation.
I conclude that no created essence is an extramental universal. This allows
us also refine to Scotus’s second argument. Suppose that accidents such
as quantities (but not just quantities—qualities will be a case in point too)
actualize passive potencies (passive powers or liabilities) in their supposita.
The passive potency that a suppositum possesses for its accidents is had by it
in virtue of the essence it exemplifies. The essence is numerically one; so the
passive potency is too. For a suppositum to possess an accident is for its passive
potency to be actualized. But suppose two supposita, x and y, possess the same
passive potency L—a liability for an accident F. And suppose x exemplifies F.
In this case L is actualized. But y possesses L too. L’s actualization is what it is
for a suppositum that possesses L to possess accident F. So y possesses F too.
The point of all this is that things exemplifying immanent universals
will be such that some of their accidents and operations—those possessed
in virtue of the exemplification of their essence—will be numerically iden-
tical. Since no created supposita share numerically the same accidents and
the instantiation of a nature or essence. All human beings can breathe; some, on the
other hand, appear in virtue of their genetic makeup to be incapable of discerning
differences in musical pitch. The first of these looks unequivocally to be a power
possessed in virtue of the instantiation of human nature; the second of these looks
unequivocally to be something possessed in virtue of the individuating conditions
of a suppositum.
41. Some of the medievals use considerations such as these to argue against a
real distinction between a suppositum and its causal powers—see, for example, Scotus,
Ord. 2.16.un., n. 16 (Wadding, 6:770), following Henry of Ghent, Quod. 3.14 (1:66vP).
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operations as all other members of their kind, no created essence is an
immanent universal.
There is a problem here, which is that there is a prima facie equivoca-
tion on the notion of being possessed “in virtue of the exemplification of
an essence.” The problem is that, accepting a closely analogous claim that
certain of the accidents and operations of an individual could be possessed
by it in virtue of its instantiation of an essence, Scotus’s common natures do
not seem to provide a way to block the possession of the same accidents by
all individuals instantiating the essence. (Think of breathing in the case of a
human being.) If an accident is possessed “in virtue of the instantiation of
an essence,” then how can anything instantiating the essence fail to possess
the accident? How could (numerically) distinct natures of the same kind
(the divided instances of a common nature) be sufficiently differentiated in
these various instances to allow for the nature to necessitate the possession
of an accident in one of its instances, but not in another?
There is an answer available here. Put bluntly, a suppositum that exempli-
fies an immanent universal exemplifies a one-of-many, and this numerically
unified universal is sufficient for the possession of a power that is itself a
one-of-many, and of an operation or accident that is a one-of-many too. An
individual that instantiates (is an instantiation of) a created common na-
ture instantiates a nature that is (in its instantiations) numerically many.
The powers possessed in virtue of the possession of such a nature will be
specifically the same in each instance, but not numerically the same. The
powers will have, as instantiated, numerical multiplicity, too. And, likewise,
the operations. Thus, in order to block extreme realism, we just need to iden-
tify supposita of the same kind, that possess a certain sort of causal power in
virtue of their essence, such that the actions brought about in virtue of this
causal power by the different supposita are not themselves numerically iden-
tical. There will be many such supposita, since (minimally) the things many
supposita do are dependent upon their circumstances. It may be thought
that, in those cases where instantiated natures are divided, division does not
seem to provide any more grounds for the possession of different properties
than mere communicability does—given that in both cases the nature(s) are
indiscernible. The analysis in terms of different causal powers helps us see
why this is wrong. If a nature is divided in the way outlined above, the causal
powers possessed by individuals in virtue of their possession of the nature
are divided up too: Felix the cat’s causal powers are numerically distinct
from his sister Polly’s. And this seems to be sufficient for Felix’s being able
to cause factually different things from those which Polly causes. Felix can
be asleep while Polly is torturing a mouse.
The point of all this is that the objections Scotus has to extreme realism
are not objections about its logical coherence. Indeed, the problem for
him is in finding a cogent argument against the applicability of extreme
realism in the standard cases of created substances of one kind. I hope that
I have shown that Scotus’s two theories of universals—variously universals as
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thought objects and universals as extramental objects—are both coherent,
and that there are in principle good reasons for arguing that created natures
are, and the divine nature is not, divisible. All this opens the way for Scotus to
see the divine nature as an immanent universal. I explore this Scotist insight
in a further paper, with a view to showing that Scotus develops a theory of the
Trinity that avoids accepting either three Gods or just one divine person.42
42. See my “Duns Scotus on Divine Substance and the Trinity.”
